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THE LINA C IlE Q U AIlTEIlLY

DIRECT AND INDIRECT ABORTION
Ques tion: W ill you pl e a s e
explain the difference between
.. direct" and .. indirect " abortion?
Also, plea se explain why the
former is never allowed, whereas
the latter is sometimes licit ?
The questions are timely , as the
a nswers involve principles that a re
of frequent application in medicomoral problems. Moreover, those
who fail to grasp these principles
are apt to think that some distinctions made by Catholic moralists
are mere words, subtleties that
have no place in deciding issues
that involve life or death.

rhage in a threatened abortion, the
doctor wishes to use a tampon. He
realizes , however, that this may
bring about the expulsion of the
inviable fetus . Is he justified in
resorting to this procedure?
6. Having frUitlessly tried all
other means of removing the disastrous effect of hyp e remesis
gravidarum , the doctor wishes to
empty the uterus, even though it
contains a living inviable fetus. Is
this procedure licit as a last resort?
7. An operable cancer of the cervix is discovered ea rly in preg nancy. May the radical operation
be performed at that time in order
Illustrative Problems
to save the life of the mother?
Our discussion of principles will
8. While driving his car at a
be clearer if we first cite a number reasonable speed, a man sees a
of sim ple illustrative problems.
pedestrian a short distance ahead
1. A man who knows nothing of him. He puts on his brakes,
about the effects of strong liquor but the brakes fail to hold, and
takes a large quantity of whisky , the result is that he kills the pedeswith the result that he becomes trian. Up to this time there had
intoxicated and severely injures been no reason for suspecting
himself and several others. Is he faulty brake s . I s the driver
responsible befor e God _ for the . morally responsible for the death
effects of his drinking ?
of the pedestrian?
2. A doctor who ha s made a ll
Principle of Imputability
reasonable efforts to di scover
whether a woman is pregnant, and
All the problems just cited deal
who ha s concluded that she is not with an action or procedure that
pregnant, performs an operation produces or is likely to produce a
which kills a living fetus. Is he harmful effect. Concerning such
morally responsible for the death problems , the firs t question that
of the fetus?
arises in the mind of the moralist
3. A married woman who has is this : when is a person morally
tried to prevent conception fail s responsible (that is : responsible
in this immoral effort and becomes before God) for such harmful
pregnant. To avoid the burden of effects? To answer th is question ,
caring for . children, she takes a Catholic moralists have formulated
drug which is supposed to induce the follOWing principle:
an abortion. Is she morally justi" A man is responsible for the
fied in indUcing the abortion?
evil effects of his actions, if these
4. A pregnant unmarried three conditions a re verified: (1)
woman wishes to have an abor- he realizes that the evil effect may
tion in order to protect her good
take place ; (2) he is able to avoid
na me. Is this permissible?
the action that produces the evil
5. To check a severe hemor- effect; and (3) he is conscious of
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an obligation to refrain from plac~
ing the action lest this effect follow. If anyone of these conditions
is not verified, a man is not guilty
before God for causing the evil
effect. "
The first of the conditions is
surely the plainest kind of common sense, and it explains why the
man in problem 1 cannot be said
to be morally gUilty of drunkenness or morally responsible for the
harm done while intoxicated . For
in taking the whisky he did not
even suspect its power. And the
same is to be said of the doctor
in problem 2. When he operated
he was reasonably certain that the
, woman was not pregnant; the
death of the fetus was merely an
unfortunate accident, as far as he
was concerned.
The second condition is also
common sense; and it surely re~
quires no proof for one who understands the meaning of moral
responsibility. For the very basis
of human responsibility is freedom;
and one who cannot avoid a harmful action is not free . I do not
know whether this condition can
be aptly illustrated by any type of
medical or surgical case; but prob ~
lem 8 seems to be a clear example
of inability to stop the harm-producing action . A driver with useless brakes is a very ' helpless person in a crisis.
The moralists' headache comes
in explaining the third condition.
Common sense, of course, tells us
that we are not obliged to abstain
from all actions that produce harm ful results; otherwise life would
be an almost intolerable burden.
But common sense will not even
suggest a practical rule for judging when such actions must be
omitted and when they may be
performed. This practical rule
must be arrived at by a careful
analysis of the third condition . The
analysis can be expressed by the
following series of questions:
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a) Will the contemplated action
produce some good effect? If the
only effect of the action is evil.
then one who foresees this cannot
perform the action without at the
same time willing the evil. For
example, in problem 3, the only
effect of the drug is to induce the
abortion; hence the taking of the
drug cannot be morally justifiable.
b) Is the person who places the
action sincerely seeking the good
effect, and not the evil effect? None
of the problems explicitly illustrates this point; yet it is an important one in medico-moral problems. For example, it might happen that certain procedures such
as that mentioned in problem 5
(" using a tampon to stop hemorrhage) could be justifiable; yet
even in these cases the doctor could
render his action morally culpable
by wishing to kill the child.
c) Is the good effect produced
by means of the evil effect? Both
sound reason and divine revelation
teach us that we must not do evil
in order to obtain good . This principle is violated in problems 4 and
6, for in both these cases the inviable fetus is expelled as a means
of obtaining the good results. The
woman's reputation (problem 4)
is saved only by getting rid of th e
fetus ; and the vomiting (problem
6) is stopped only by the emptying of the uteru s. On the other
hand , in problems 5 and 7 we have
examples of good effects caused by
the procedures themselves. It is
the packing, not the abortion , that
stops the hemorrhage; and it is
the removal of the cancer, not the
death of the fetus , that saves the
mother 's life.
d) Is the good effect of sufficient
value to compensate for the harmful effect? The general idea here
is not difficult to grasp. But the
actual estimate of relative values
in concrete cases is often very difficult. For example , in problem 5
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the justification for using the tampon and risking an abortion would
depend on whether some other
simpler treatment would produce
the desired result of saving the
mother. And in problem 7, the
justification of performing the
radical operation would depend on
the possibility of waiting until the
fetus reaches viability and still saving the mother.

Principle of Double Effect
I have gone to some length in
explaining and analysing the general principle of moral imputability
for evil effects, because this explanation and analysis contain all the
raw materials for another, and
slightly different, principle which
is often used by moralists, especially in their solution of medicomoral problems. I refer to the socalled " principle of the double
effect." In formulating this particular principle, the moralists put in
capsule form all the points that I
explained in my analysis of the
third condition referred to in the
principle of imputability. In brief
form, the prinCiple of the double
effect may be stated as follows :
.. It is licit to perform an ac tion
which has good and ba d effects
provided: (a) that the action itself is not morally bad ; (b) that
the evil effect is Sincerely not desired, but merely tolerated ; (c)
that the evil is not the means of
obtaining the good effect; and (d)
that the good effect is sufficiently
important to balance or outweigh
the harmful effect."
.
I might add here that, though it
is often necessa ry to test the licitness of medical and surgical procedures by applying the principle
of the double effect, this is not
always the case. For example, in
ordinary mutilations such as the
removal of th e appendix or gall
bladder or the amputation of an
infected limb. there is no need of

resorting to this principle; for these
organs have a natural subordination to the entire body, and man
has a na tural right to mutilate or
remove them when this is necessary for the good of the whole
body. In such cases, therefore , the
principle that evil may not be done
in order to obtain some good res ult
does not apply. The evil may be
desired and caused in order to obtai n some proportiona te benefit for
the whole body.
But when there is question of
procedures w hich cause evil effects
that are outside the scope of man 's
direct rights, the principle of the
double effect mu st be applied. For
example, the generative function ,
as such. is a social function and
is not directly subordinated to the
good of the individual; hence procedures that induce sterility must
be tested by the principle of the
double effect.
Similarly, the principle of the
double effect must be applied to all
procedures that are designed to
benefit the mother but which also
involve the danger of abortion or
of some other harm to the child;
for the life and well-being of the
child are not subordinated to the
life a nd well-being of the moth er.
This point brings us to the question s asked at the beginning of our
discussion.

Direct and Indirect Abortion
By a bortion I mean the interruption of a pregnancy before the
fetu s is viable. The supposition is
tha t the fetus is still alive and
that the placenta is still attached
to the mother. To expel a dead
fetus is not an abortion ; nor is it
an abortion to remove from the
uterus a fetus which is already
completely detached from the
mother.
An abortion is said to be dire ct
when the interruption of the pregnancy is intended either as a n end
in itself (as in problem 3) or as
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a means to some other end (as in
problems 4 and 6) . In such cases
the procedure is precisely directed
to the interruption of the preg~
nancy; hence the life of the fetus
is directly attacked. Such procedures, even when euphemistically
labeled "therapeutic," are never
licit. Note the following strong
words of Pius XI on this point :
"As to the ' medical and thera ~
peutic indication' to which , using
their own words , We have made
reference , Venerable Brethren ,
however much We may pity the
mother whose health a nd even life
is gravely imperiled in the per~
formance of the duty allotted to
her by nature , nevertheless what
could ever be a sufficient reason
for excusing in any way the direct
murder of the innocent? This is
precisely what we are dealing with
here. Whether inflicted upon the
mother or upon the child it is
against the precept of God and
the law of nature : 'Thou shalt
not kill.' The life of each is equally
sacred, and no one has the power,
not even the public authority, to
destroy it."
An abortion is said to be indirect
when the interruption of the preg ~
nancy is the undesired but un~
avoidable effect of a procedure
which is immediately directed to
some other good purpose (e.g. the
stopping of hemorrhage, as in
problem 5, or the removal of can cer, as in problem 7) . Granted
that an abortion is merely indirect,
it may be permitted for a suffi~
ciently serious reason (e.g . when
the procedure is really necessary
to save the life of the mother),
beca use in this case all the condi~
tions of the principle of th e double
effect are applicabl e.
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